Case law is slowly approaching Western standards. Jury trials were held in some areas. There are basically two types of courts in Russia. District and federal courts (Constitutional Court and Supreme Court). There are no special courts to which appeals are lodged. Appeals are dealt with by the Constitutional Court. Under the 2002 Federal Act on Organs of the Judiciary, which provides the legal basis for self-governing judicial bodies, the All-Russian Congress of Judges is the highest organ of the judiciary. [16] Congress elects members of the Council of the Judiciary, the autonomous body of the judiciary. [16] A jury must be 25 years of age, have legal capacity and have a criminal record. [11] What about the possibility of a democratic breakthrough that inaugurates constitutionalism in Russia? If the Putin regime falls into the midst of a pro-democratic social mobilization, the rule of law and an independent judiciary could emerge as one of the main goals of the democratic revolution. However, this does not mean that this goal is easy to achieve. Post-Euromaidan Ukraine offers a cautionary tale.

One of Russia`s first important steps towards integration into the European judicial space after the collapse of the Soviet Union was its accession to the Council of Europe. This happened exactly twenty years ago, on 28 February 1996, and was widely regarded as proof of the Russian Federation`s determination to become a State that respects human rights, the rule of law and democracy. In 2002, the Putin government promised to cut $1.5 billion over four years to hire more judges, raise judges` salaries, and provide prosecutors with new equipment and staff. The lawsuit against Yukos oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky – a vocal critic of Putin – was seen as a major miscarriage of justice. See Yukos, Economic History However, these positive developments are hampered by less promising trends that raise concerns about Russia`s ability to complete the transition to an accessible, efficient, transparent and credible judicial system. We have identified four main problems: problems related to the non-enforcement of court decisions, obstacles to the international human rights protection system, insufficient independence of the judiciary and excessive law enforcement powers. The justice system is so weak that victims of crime often have little recourse, even if they know who the criminals are, especially if the criminals are associated with gangsters or the elite. The New York Times described a man who was the victim of a highway robbery. Although those involved in the crime were arrested after the robbery, they were not arrested because one of them was the son of a major gangster.

Liberal constitutionalism combined with the rule of law is based on two main principles: equality of responsibility and protection before the law, and substantive and procedural guarantees of the fundamental rights of the individual. This means that everyone, including high-ranking members of the regime and its sovereign, is equally limited by the constitution and ordinary legislation, not only on paper but also in practice. Liberal constitutionalism also requires a set of substantive laws that provide for fundamental rights. A politically independent and impartial judiciary is crucial, as independent courts can better ensure that all litigants are equally bound by the law, regardless of their political, material or legal resources. At the meeting of the President of the Russian Federation with the Russian Human Rights Council in October last year, certain problems were raised regarding the functioning of the Russian judicial system. President Vladimir Putin has agreed to consider these issues and, if necessary, amend the law accordingly. In our opinion, the improvement of the Russian judicial system should be a daily agenda in Russia. We have worked with Russia over the past 17 years and have seen several waves of significant judicial reform. However, problems remain. In short, Russia is unlikely to become a constitutional or constitutional state after Putin. Whether Putin plans to die in power, lose power in a color revolution, or be replaced after the collapse of his authoritarian coalition, the prospects for a transition to constitutionalism and an independent judiciary are slim. Internal and external pressure on the Putin regime to abandon instrumental law enforcement is low.

Ironically, the potential agents of change are Putin himself and members of his authoritarian coalition, not civil society. A gradual transition to authoritarian constitutionalism is theoretically possible if Putin and his close associates plan to leave politics and need guarantees that future political office holders will not use the law and docile justice to prosecute them. Alternatively, a group of large corporate owners could lobby for the rule of law to protect their assets. In practice, however, Putin`s demonstrated preference for informal negotiations rather than formal institutions as tools for coordination makes the former scenario unlikely. And the transformation of the robber barons for the rule of law was expected over the past two decades; but we have yet to see any indication that this will happen.31 Khodorkovsky`s case is a little less simple; Legal analysts believe the evidence of wrongdoing against him and his oil company Yukos was stronger than in Navalny`s case.8 But even though Khodorkovsky and Yukos committed large-scale tax evasion, fraud, and embezzlement, as noted by the ECHR in 2013, Yukos` business practices in the 1990s were the norm rather than the exception.