Legal Conceptions of Human Rights

There are a number of internationally recognized organizations with a global mandate or jurisdiction over certain aspects of human rights: civil and political rights are enshrined in Articles 3 to 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR. Economic, social and cultural rights are enshrined in articles 22 to 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The UDHR included economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights because it was based on the principle that different rights could only exist successfully in combination: a human right to a safe environment or environmental protection does not directly address issues such as animal claims or biodiversity. although it may do so indirectly with the idea of ecosystem services for humans (see Biodiversity and Human Rights. The justification of the human right to a safe environment should show that environmental problems pose a serious threat to fundamental human interests, values or norms; that governments can adequately assume the responsibility to protect populations from these threats; and that most governments do have the capacity to do so. In the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes established a contractualist theory of legal positivism about what everyone could agree on: what they sought (happiness) was controversial, but a broad consensus could form around what they feared (violent death at the hands of another). Natural law was how a rational person who wanted to survive and prosper would act. It was discovered by looking at the natural rights of humanity, whereas previously it could be said that natural rights were discovered by considering natural law. In Hobbes` view, the only way for natural law to prevail was for people to submit to the ruler`s orders. Therein lies the foundations of the theory of a social contract between the governed and the governor. Should human rights be defined in such a way that they are always moral rights or «reflect» them? Philosophers who range from moral philosophy to human rights theory sometimes assume that human rights must be fundamentally moral rights rather than legal rights. However, it is not a contradiction when people say they believe in human rights, but only when it comes to legal rights at the national or international level. As Louis Henkin noted, «political forces have raised the main philosophical objections and bridged the gap between natural and positive law by transforming natural human rights into positive rights» (Henkin 1978).

However, theorists who insist that human rights alone are legal rights may find the interpretations they can give of universality, independent existence, and high priority to be weak. What is considered a «human right»? The UN divides them into five types: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In August 2003, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights submitted to the Commission on Human Rights draft norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights. [79] These were audited by the Commission on Human Rights in 2004, but do not have binding status for business and are not monitored. [80] In addition, the UN Sustainable Development Goal 10 aims to significantly reduce inequalities by 2030 by promoting appropriate legislation. [81] 35. Thus, until recently, international and regional human rights courts tended to interpret the right to life as a risk of violation, particularly for the purposes of assessing the right to refugee status, only in cases of imminent violence of sufficient intensity to create a real risk of irreparable harm: see, for example, General Comment No. 31 of the Human Rights Committee in UNHRCOR, Meeting 80, 2187.

Mtg, document CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.1326, May 2004, para. 12; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, No. 8319/07, [2011] IV ECHR 218. More recently, however, the same judicial authorities consider that slow-moving processes related to climate change are sufficient conditions for assessing an imminent threat to the right to life: see, for example, the recent 2020 decision of the Human Rights Committee on communication No 2728/2016 of the UN Human Rights Council, Views adopted by the Committee established under article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol; on Communication No 2728/2016, document CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, January 2020, paragraph 9; Cordella and Others v. Italy, no. 54414/13, [2019] I ECHR 157; see also, for example, Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser A) No 23, paragraph 47. The practice of recognition has expanded to include new criteria for the scope of the human right to life. The duty of the State to respect, promote, protect and fulfil rights is therefore paramount, as is that of regional or subsidiary international tribunals, and applies especially when the State intentionally or systematically violates rights. We all know examples of the need to use regional and international mechanisms to recognize that violations occur at the national level. Regional and international concerns or support may be the trigger for guaranteeing rights at the national level, but this only happens when all national possibilities are used and exhausted.

That is why we will devote the rest of this section to this scenario. What recourse is available if national systems have not ensured adequate protection of the enjoyment of human rights? So far, there are three permanent regional courts that exist as monitoring bodies specifically for the implementation of human rights: the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples` Rights (ACHPR). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was established in 1979 by the Organization of American States to interpret and enforce the American Convention on Human Rights. The African Court is the youngest of the regional courts and was established in January 2004. It decides cases in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples` Rights concerning member States of the African Union. The judges of the Court, based in Arusha, Tanzania, were elected in 2006 and delivered its first Judgment in December 2009, in which it declared itself incompetent to hear the case of Yogogombaye v. Senegal. What should these bodies actively do to adequately protect the human rights of the individual? Does my daughter`s human right to an adequate education require the Ministry of Education to do everything in its power to support and improve my child`s education? Does this require the provision of a world-class library, frequent study trips abroad and the employment of the most competent and qualified teachers? The answer, of course, is no. Given the relative scarcity of resources and the demands placed on those resources, we are inclined to say that adequate guarantees of the human rights of individuals go as far as establishing appropriate social and governmental practices to ensure that all have the opportunity to live a minimally good life. First and foremost, national Governments have the primary responsibility to ensure that the human rights of their own citizens are duly respected. Philosophers such as Brian Orend (2002) support this effort when he writes that the goal of human rights is to ensure «a minimum of decent and respectful treatment.» However, it is important to note that the obligation to ensure a minimum level of decent and respectful treatment cannot be strictly limited by national borders.

Adequate protection and promotion of the human rights of all requires, for example, that the richest and most powerful nation-States provide sufficient assistance to countries that are currently unable to adequately protect the fundamental rights of their own citizens. While some may find Orend`s pursuit of human rights too cautious, even the briefest glimpse of the extent of human suffering and deprivation in many parts of the world today is enough to show how far we are from reaching even this fairly minimal standard. The philosophical debate between universalists and relativists is far too complex to summarize here. However, some immediate responses to the relativistic critique of human rights are immediately available. First, mere reference to moral diversity and the presumed integrity of individual cultures and societies does not in itself provide a philosophical justification for relativism or a sufficient critique of universalism. After all, there were and still are many cultures and societies whose treatment of one`s own people leaves much to be desired. Does relativism really ask us to recognize and respect the integrity of Nazi Germany or any other similar repressive regime? There is little doubt that relativism in its present form is incompatible with human rights. At first glance, this seems to give argumentative weight to universalist support for human rights.

Finally, one can speculate on the willingness of a relativist to effectively renounce the possession of human rights if and when the social environment requires it. Similarly, relativistic arguments are usually advanced by members of political elites in countries whose systematic oppression of their peoples has attracted the attention of human rights defenders. The exponential growth of people`s human rights organizations in many countries of the world, whose cultures are supposedly incompatible with the implementation of human rights, raises serious questions about the validity and integrity of these «indigenous» relativists. At worst, the doctrine of moral relativism could be used to illegitimately justify oppressive political systems.